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Market Discipline and EU Corporate Governance Reform in the Banking 
Sector: Merits, Fallacies, and Cognitive Boundaries 
 
Emilios Avgouleas* and Jay Cullen** 
 
Much contemporary analysis has concluded that the recent financial crisis and bank 
failures were, inter alia, the result of a breakdown in corporate governance regimes 
and market discipline. New regulations strongly advocate market-based remedies 
such as tighter investor monitoring and greater control over executives' 
remuneration, in order to safeguard financial stability. We argue that this approach 
largely ignores three very important aspects of modern financial markets that cannot 
be constrained through market discipline: (a) socio-psychological phenomena; (b) the 
epistemological properties of financial market innovation; and (c) the inherent 
inability of market participants to predict uncertain risk correlations. Therefore, this 
article argues that excessive EU focus on corporate governance reforms, as a means 
to improve financial stability, detracts attention from much more significant concerns, 
chiefly the issue of optimal bank structure. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Building the different blocs of corporate governance over several decades has been a 
painstaking exercise aimed at curbing the privileges of insider classes and fostering 
shareholder democracy. Effective corporate governance has been placed at the heart 
of capitalist growth initiatives and is rightly regarded as a key component of a free 
enterprise economy that wishes to retain its legitimacy in a liberal democracy. As a 
result, every time that the economy experiences some form of corporate collapse, 
policy-makers and the industry try to upgrade their corporate governance toolkit and 
legislate for ever-higher standards of governance.1 
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1 A characteristic example, in this context, is the enactment of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, which were a combination of insider abuses and 
accounting frauds. 
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Thus, it is not surprising that in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
(“GFC”) most commentators’ and policymakers’ analysis focused on actual and 
assumed corporate governance failures within big banks. According to this narrative, 
if reckless bankers were reigned in, and market discipline was restored, banks would 
be buttressed against the possibility of failure. A flurry of legislation and legislative 
proposals has followed, placing sound corporate governance at the heart of regulatory 
reforms trying to restore health to the banking sector. 
While some of these initiatives constitute a marked improvement over the 
shambolic structures governing banks in the recent past, they are bound to disappoint 
in terms of effectiveness. The reason for that is not a lack of good intentions on the 
part of the champions of corporate governance reform, but a number of fallacies in the 
analysis of the standard narrative. For example, it may be plausibly argued that no 
corporate governance model can work when the principal actors face severe 
limitations in their knowledge and understanding of risk due to objective factors, such 
as complexity, or lack of transparency in financial transactions. The interconnected 
and opaque structure of banks, the increasing complexity of their operations, and the 
short-termism of the financial sector – that is subject more than other sectors to fads, 
herding, and irrational mood swings – place insurmountable obstacles both to a 
board’s capacity to run the bank and shareholders’ ability to monitor them.2 These 
limitations are compounded by more general cognitive boundaries facing shareholders 
and directors: so-called ‘bounded rationality’.3 Lender-of-last-resort facilities and the 
strong possibility of a public rescue further blunt the disciplining power of the market 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For a discussion of the limitations of market discipline in the banking sector see E. Avgouleas, 
'Breaking Up Mega-Banks: A New Regulatory Model for the Separation of Commercial Banking from 
Investment Banking' in Financial Services at the Crossroads - Implications for Supervision, 
Institutional Design and Trade, eds. P. Delimatsis and N. Helger (2011) 179. 
3 Bounded rationality refers to the limited ability of humans to process information because of their 
limited computational ability and flawed memory. See H. A. Simon, ‘A Behavioral Model of Rational 
Choice’ (1955) 69 Q. J. of Economics 99. For an analysis of these biases and the contexts in which they 
tend to appear and decisions that they influence, even when decision makers act under conditions of 
intense competition and are sophisticated actors, see E. Avgouleas, 'The Global Financial Crisis and the 
Disclosure Paradigm in European Financial Regulation: The Case for Reform' (2009) 6 European 
Company and Financial Law Rev. 440; E. Avgouleas, 'Reforming Investor Protection Regulation: The 
Impact of Cognitive Biases' in Essays in the Law and Economics of Regulation in Honour of Anthony 
Ogus, ed. M. Faure & F. Stephen (2008) 143. 
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and provide shareholders and management with a partial shield from business risk, 
providing incentives for excessive risk-taking.4 
Accordingly, this article argues that a second and more powerful narrative 
should be added to the standard narrative on which EU legislation and 
recommendations addressing problems of incentive re-alignment are based. The 
article suggests that bank size, structure and complexity were as much responsible for 
insider rent-seeking and inadequate shareholder/stakeholder monitoring. Therefore, 
EU and international initiatives to improve bank corporate governance may not prove 
effective in addressing the incentives issue, unless the structure of the banking sector 
is itself reformed and banks become smaller, less interconnected, and easier to 
manage.  
This article is in five sections. The first is the present introduction. The second 
section will discuss EU legislation, proposals and other initiatives to revamp 
corporate governance in the banking sector. The third section will cast doubt on the 
central thesis of these reforms, namely that corporate governance in big banks can be 
effective and protect against the risk of systemic failure. The fourth section discusses 
the potential of structural reform to improve bank governance. The fifth section 
concludes. 
 
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE EU BANKING 
SECTOR 
 
1. The Corporate Governance Failure Rationale 
 
The near collapse of many European banks, resulting from a number of disastrous 
corporate and regulatory policies – as well as abysmal board decisions and 
management control failures5 – brought into sharp focus corporate governance in the 
banking sector. Subsequently, a widespread belief that bank corporate governance 
was in a dismal state in the pre-GFC era has taken hold in academic and policy-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 F. J. Fabozzi, F. Modigliani and M. G. Ferri, Foundations of Financial Markets and Institutions 
(2007, 4th edn.). 
5 For example, see the damning report of the Financial Services Authority into the RBS collapse: FSA, 
The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland: Financial Services Authority Board Report (December 2011) 
at 220-250, available at <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf >. 
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making circles,6 and these views have sketched a clear roadmap towards a safer 
financial sector. Capital, liquidity, and other regulatory reforms would be augmented 
by higher governance standards and altered compensation structures in order to 
enhance board capacity, shareholder monitoring, and eliminate perverse incentives.  
During the initial phases of the GFC, attention on bank corporate governance 
failures was minimal.7 However, as marked failures of risk management and control 
were revealed, regulatory focus quickly altered. The de Larosiere Report into the 
financial supervision of European banks conceded that corporate governance was 
“one of the most important failures of the recent crisis”8, as corporate governance 
systems within financial institutions provided weak incentives for consideration of 
long-term sustainable investment policies and neglected the interests of bank 
stakeholders such as government sponsored deposit-guarantors. In the UK, an 
independent review of corporate governance at banks was established9 by the British 
Parliament, and the FSA acknowledged that: “poor governance [whilst]… only one of 
many factors contributing to the crisis … has widely been acknowledged as an 
important one.”10 
Moreover, the debate on bankers’ remuneration has captured the attention of 
both the public and policymakers – and, for very good reasons. A small group of 
insiders was rewarded handsomely for shifting the risk of their actions to society at 
large. Professor Bebchuk, and others, have argued strongly that remuneration 
structures in banks were strewn with perverse incentives, which fostered short-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The potential drawbacks to this view are succinctly articulated by Cheffins, who has urged caution in 
the face of wholesale reform to corporate governance. See B. R. Cheffins, ‘Did Corporate Governance 
“Fail” during the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500’ (2009) 65 Business Law 1. 
7 As noted by O’ Mülbert: “…numerous reports, documents and statements published in 2008 dealing 
with the causes and consequences of the financial crisis do not even mention the corporate governance 
of banks. This holds true, inter alia, for the reports prepared by the (US) President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, the Financial Stability Board (FSB…) the IMF, the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF), the G-20 Study Group, the Declaration of the Washington Summit of the G-20 
proposing the “Action Plan to implement Principles for Reform”, and the German Council of 
Economic Experts.” See P. O’ Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis - 
Theory, Evidence, Reforms’, ECGI Working  Paper 130/2009 (April 2010), at 7-8 (notes omitted). 
8 The de Larosiere Group, The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (February 2009), 
at 29. 
9 D. Walker, A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities – 
Final recommendations (November 2009) available at <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/walker_review_information.htm>. 
10 Financial Services Authority, Effective Corporate Governance (Consultation Paper 10/3, January 
2010) available at <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp103.pdf>. 
! &!
termism and excessive risk taking11 and that, by implication, they were directly 
causative of the GFC and ensuing bank failures. Accordingly, regulation of executive 
remuneration12 came to be seen as the most effective path to restoring bank health and 
the stability of the financial system. 
 
2. The State of Reform in the EU 
 
(a) The Drive to Reform Bank Corporate Governance 
Following generalized clamour about corporate governance failures in the banking 
sector, the EC Commission released a Green Paper13 on corporate governance in 
financial institutions in June 2010.14 The Green Paper noted that: “although corporate 
governance did not directly cause the crisis, the lack of effective control mechanisms 
contributed significantly to excessive risk-taking on the part of financial 
institutions.” 15  In summary, it highlighted the following functional failures of 
corporate governance in financial institutions prior to the GFC: 
 
(i) Deficient board oversight and control, driven particularly by a failure to 
challenge executives, and a lack of expertise amongst non-executive 
directors. This encompassed weak risk management, attributable to a 
failure of boards and senior management to comprehend the risks 
associated with financial products that were traded by institutions (leading 
to collective over-reliance on ratings), and insufficient consideration of 
aggregate risks that had been assumed across firms.16 
 
(ii) Insufficient shareholder control over risk-taking, derived from a mismatch 
between the interests of shareholders and the long-term interests of 
financial institutions. Structural obstacles to effective engagement between 
shareholders and management including monitoring costs and voting 
restrictions, and the limited holding periods of many bank shareholders 
exacerbated these issues;17 and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 L. A. Bebchuk, A. Cohen and H. Spamann, ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear 
Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008’ (2010) 27 Yale J. on Regulation 257.  
12 L. A. Bebchuk and H. Spamann, ‘Regulating Bankers’ Pay’ (2010) 98 Georgetown Law J. 247. 
13 See Commission, Green Paper on The EU Corporate Governance Framework (COM(2011) 164).  
14  EC Commission, Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and 
Remuneration Policies (COM(2010) 284). 
15 id., at 2. 
16 id., 3.3. 
17 id., 3.5. 
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(iii) Supervisory failure to effectively monitor bank governance, a 
fragmentation of regulatory competence, and potential conflicts of 
interests between financial institutions and their auditors.18 
 
In response to these findings, the Commission recommended in its Green Paper19 that 
the following measures be adopted: 
 
(i) Increased independence and skill amongst board members at EU financial 
institutions to ensure effective monitoring of management. To further this, 
the creation of a specialist risk supervision committee, within the board of 
directors and with enhanced status for the chief risk officer, would assist 
board members in evaluating business strategies;20 
 
(ii) A standardised shareholder ‘stewardship code’ at EU banks, on a ‘comply 
or explain’ basis, together with heightened transparency on voting policies. 
Increased monitoring of both the incentives and conflicts of interests of 
asset managers ought to be implemented.21 Further, certain corporate 
policies – including the remuneration of board members and senior 
managers – should be subject to a binding shareholder vote.22 
 
(iii) Increased national supervisory resources and strengthened pan-European 
corporate governance oversight and co-operation amongst supervisory 
colleges. Governance supervisors ought to be given a duty to ensure the 
correct functioning and effectiveness of boards of directors, and to 
periodically review the risk management functions within financial 
institutions.23 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 id., 3.6-3.7. 
19 Commission Staff Working Paper, Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions: Lessons to be 
drawn from the current financial crisis, best practices (COM(2010) 669). 
20 EC Commission Green Paper, op. cit., n. 13, 5.1-5.2. 
21  id. 5.5. This could be accomplished via an institutional investor discussion platform and 
implemented via changes to the Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency 
requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a 
regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ (L 390)). 
22 Commission Staff Working Paper, op. cit., n. 19, 4.1.6. These powers are already provided for by the 
Shareholder Rights Directive (Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies). 
23 EC Commission Green Paper, op. cit., n. 13, 5.4. 
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(b) Regulating Executive Remuneration 
The EC Commission has issued several Recommendations24 in relation to executive 
remuneration in financial institutions since 2008.25 Many of the provisions of these 
Recommendations were based on work undertaken by the Financial Stability Board.26  
The Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Sector27 (‘EC Remuneration Recommendation’) invited Member States to adopt 
measures in four major areas: (1) structure of the remuneration policy; (2) 
governance; (3) disclosure; and (4) supervision by competent authorities. 28  Its 
provisions were designed to apply to staff whose “professional activities have a 
material impact on the risk profile of the financial undertaking.”29 According to the 
EU Commission, remuneration awards ought to be re-calibrated to align the “personal 
objectives of staff members with the long-term interests of the financial undertaking 
concerned”.30 Also, the assessment period of performance on which remuneration is 
based must be between three to five years.31 Clawback provisions should be used 
where remuneration is awarded on the basis of financial performance which later 
transpires to have been based on the adoption of excessive risk.32 Deferment of bonus 
payments should be utilized to ensure that any tail-risk in a financial institution’s 
investment strategy has the chance to be winnowed out.33 To achieve this, the “actual 
payment of performance-based components of remuneration [ought to be] spread over 
the business cycle of the company.”34  
To enforce the Recommendation, the EC Commission implemented a new 
Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 2010/76/EU (“CRD III”))35 which subjects 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial Services Sector, 
2009/384/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 120), at 22. 
25 In particular, see Commission Recommendation of 29 April 2009 C(2009) 3177 complementing 
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of 
directors of listed companies. 
26 Financial Stability Board, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: Implementation Standards 
(September 2009). 
27 Commission Recommendation on Remuneration, op. cit., n. 24. 
28 id., 4–12, at 25–27. 
29 id., para. 13. 
30 id., para. 14. 
31 id.  
32 id., 5.1. 
33 id., 4.4. 
34
 id., 5.2. 
35 Directive 2010/76/EU [2010] OJ L329/3 amending the Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 
2006/48/EC [2006] OJ L177/1 and Directive 2006/49/EC [2006] OJ L177/201) to recommend that 
capital requirements under the new Basel III framework be subject to adjustment by supervisors where 
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the remuneration policies of financial institutions to supervisory oversight; 
supervisory authorities must now monitor the implications of remuneration policies 
for the risk management of financial institutions. CRD III imposes a mandatory 
obligation for financial firms to have remuneration policies and practices that are 
consistent with, and promote, sound and effective risk management, and empowers 
supervisors to review and – where appropriate demand changes to – firm 
remuneration policies. 
Devolution of authority to shareholders in determining executive remuneration 
was first recommended in the Commission’s 2004 Recommendation. 36  The 
Commission also recommended that, “Member States should ensure that the 
remuneration policy of a financial undertaking sets a maximum limit on the variable 
component.”37 There have been many criticisms of the proposal to cap variable 
compensation; critics have contended that the issue of executive pay is one which 
must be considered in the traditional terms of effective incentive alignment.38 These 
commentators regard greater market disclosure as the basis for improved efficiency in 
performance contracts and thereby as a solution to the principal-agent issues at 
financial institutions. However, as subsequent sections of this article shall note, these 
issues are not easily solved through market discipline. 
 
III. IS EFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF MEGA-BANKS A 
REALISTIC OBJECTIVE? 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
The authors of this article are skeptical of the ability of corporate governance reforms 
to achieve their declared objectives. Moreover, the authors remain fearful that much 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
remuneration policies appear to encourage excessive risk-taking: “The proposed amendments will 
impose a binding obligation on credit institutions and investment firms to have remuneration policies 
that are consistent with effective risk management.” See the Accompanying Document to the Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Capital Requirements 
Directive on trading book, securitization issues and remuneration policies (COM(2009) 362 final) 
(SEC(2009) 974), at 5. 
36 Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC L385/55. 
37 Commission Recommendation on Remuneration, op. cit., n. 24, 4.1. It was clear that most EU 
members would ignore that plea, and EU-wide bonus caps limiting variable compensation to 100 
percent of base salary have therefore been introduced, to take effect in 2014. See G. Ferrarini et al., 
‘Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of Reforms in Europe’ (2010) 10 J. of 
Corporate Law Studies 73. For discussion, see L. Armitstead, ‘EU vote clears way for bank bonus cap’ 
Daily Telegraph, 16th April 2013. 
38 Ferrarini et al., id., at 111. 
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of the present focus on corporate governance obfuscates the need for regulatory 
reform of long-term re-structuring of the banking sector, at the expense of financial 
stability. It is therefore appropriate to disaggregate the claims made by those who 
place corporate governance at the heart of the reform agenda at the expense of other 
probably more effective measures, such as structural reform. Accordingly, as a first 
step in our analysis it is worth considering whether banks are different than other 
corporations and, if so, why? 
Before the advent of the GFC it was widely acknowledged that banks might 
require differing corporate governance structures to non-financial corporations, for 
several reasons.39  First, banks must have regard to the interests of several sets of 
stakeholders, which is often not the case in other corporations. Company management 
at non-financial firms usually are responsible only to shareholders and creditors. 
Banks however must additionally have regard to depositors, and government-
appointed regulators. Secondly, banks perform critical (utility) functions in modern 
economies and the disruption of their operations can have far reaching effects. They 
are central to the payments and clearing systems and control the savings and 
investments of retail customers and businesses. Their actions therefore affect third 
parties and losses from financial institutions may quickly spill over into other areas of 
the economy. Thirdly, banks use high levels of leverage, which are not generally 
present in non-financial firms. They are therefore particularly vulnerable to liquidity 
shocks and losses of confidence, which require the provision of (frequently state-
backed) deposit-guarantee schemes and a central bank-operated lender of last resort 
facility.  
Moreover, two additional features of banks make them special for the 
purposes of governance. Banks tend to present much lower transparency of business 
and income lines, and of contractual relationships and risk exposures, than non-
financial companies. In addition, bank size and greater government regulation can 
make bank management and shareholders rather complacent. 40 We explain in the next 
paragraphs how bank size, the particular nature of banks as businesses, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 For extended discussion of these factors, see E. Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets: 
The Law, the Economics, the Politics (2012), ch. 3. 
40 G. Caprio Jnr. and R. Levine, ‘Corporate governance in finance: Concepts and international 
observations’ in Financial Sector Governance: The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors, eds R. E. 
Litan, M. Pomerleano and V. Sundararajan (2002) 17. 
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government regulations, such as deposit-guarantee schemes, may place considerable 
restrictions to the disciplining power of the market over big banks.41 
 
2. Objective Limits to Market Discipline 
Market discipline and its processes are understood (on the basis of intuition rather 
than precise definition)42 to include discipline imposed by shareholders and the 
market for corporate control on bank management and discipline imposed by 
subordinated short-term creditors, as well as other creditors,43 by bank customers, and 
even highly mobile groups of bank employees.44  
Most of the above are assumed to have the right incentives to monitor bank 
behaviour in order to avoid being caught in a bank failure and a messy winding up 
that would bring them large losses. The most important mechanism to facilitate 
market discipline is thought to be disclosure of accurate information to the market, 
and the market’s ability to process it properly. Further, the mix of debt and equity 
chosen by a bank is regarded as a strong determinant of the effectiveness of market 
discipline.45  Yet, market discipline works only if market actors have sufficient 
incentives to fulfill their monitoring role and there are no impediments to information 
signals.46 
However, at the individual institution level, a number of perverse incentives 
substantially weaken the strength of market discipline. The first limitation to market 
discipline is placed by the opaque nature of the financial network, which generates 
chains of (frequently invisible) claims, increasing institutions’ exposure to each other, 
and which create very strong ties of mutual economic dependence 
(interconnectedness). Moreover, although interconnectedness is an essential element 
of the financial network, it may also increase its vulnerability, especially because 
bank collapses are highly contagious and they can evolve, aided by market panic, into 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 See Avgouleas, op. cit., n. 2, at 190-191. 
42 D. T. Llewellyn, ‘Inside the ‘‘Black Box’’ of Market Discipline’ (2005) 25 Economic Affairs 41. 
43 C. W. Calomiris and C. M. Kahn, ‘The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking 
Arrangements’ (1991) 81 Am. Economic Rev. 497; and for a more realistic approach, see C. W. 
Calomiris, ‘Building an Incentive- Compatible Safety Net’ (1999) 23 J. of Banking and Finance 1499. 
44 Llewellyn, op. cit., n. 42, at 189-193. 
45 A. B. Ashcraft, ‘Does the Market Discipline Banks? New Evidence from the Regulatory Capital 
Mix’, FRB of New York Staff Report No. 244 (March 2006) available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1⁄4901805>.  
46 M. F. Hellwig, ‘Market Discipline, Information Processing and Corporate Governance’, Max Planck 
Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Preprint No. 2005/19 (October 2005). 
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full-scale financial cascades threatening the stability of the financial system.47 Thus, 
interconnectedness increases the possibility of a public bailout.  
Since interconnectedness is a clear obstacle to the resolvability of financial 
institutions, it amounts to a perverse incentive. Namely, it gives bank management a 
strong incentive to grow the balance sheet, since the larger the institution becomes 
and the more interconnected, the more likely it is that its failure will also drag down 
other interconnected institutions, necessitating a bailout. 48  However, in many cases, 
growing unnecessarily the bank’s balance sheet may be a poor business decision 
which also makes the bank more fragile, since such expansion is normally based on 
increased leverage.49 This is also a convincing explanation of the 1990s drive towards 
conglomeration in the financial sector, which has resulted in today’s mega-banks. 
Size has not just shielded banks from the risk of failure50 but also has ensured cheaper 
funding51 for years by creditors who charged banks interest rates lower than their 
risky business would warrant.52  
Opacity and interconnectedness also place strong obstacles to reforms aimed 
at enhancing market discipline through resolution regimes that lead to a wipe out of 
shareholders’ equity, or resolution tools – such as the much discussed bail-in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 A. Lo, ‘Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008’ (2009) 1 J. of 
Financial Economic Policy 5, 23; A. G. Haldane, ‘Rethinking the Financial Network’, speech delivered 
at the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam (April 2009), at 12–13.  
48 The Geneva Report 2009 calls this risk the ‘interconnectedness spillover’. See M. K. Brunnermeier, 
C. A. E. Goodhart et al., ‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation’, Geneva Reports on the 
World Economy 11 (January 2009), at 20-21. 
49 D. W. Diamond and R. G. Rajan, ‘Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility’ (2001) 
109 J. of Political Economy 287. 
50 “Why were banks willing to take risks that proved so damaging both to themselves and the rest of 
the economy? One of the key reasons – mentioned by market participants in conversations before the 
crisis hit – is that the incentives to manage risk and to increase leverage were distorted by this implicit 
support or guarantee provided by government to creditors of banks that were seen as ‘‘too important to 
fail’’. Such banks could raise funding more cheaply and expand faster than other institutions. They had 
less incentive than others to guard against tail risk. Banks and their creditors knew that if they were 
sufficiently important to the economy or the rest of the financial system, and things went wrong, the 
government would always stand behind them. And they were right.” Speech by M. King (Governor of 
the Bank of England) to Scottish Business Associations, 20 Oct. 2009, at 3, available at 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406. pdf>.  
51 A. R. Admati, et al., ‘Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: 
Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive’ Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University 
Working Paper No. 86 (September 2010). 
52 For example, evidence from the bond markets has shown that bond markets were taking a softer 
approach to big banks, assuming that they were too big to fail, or they were simply too complex in their 
structure for the bond market to understand and price effectively. See D. P. Morgan and K. J. Stiroh, 
‘Bond Market Discipline of Banks: Is the Market Tough Enough?’ Federal Reserve Board of New 
York Staff Report No. 95 (December 1999).  
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instruments – which convert bank debt (including uninsured deposits) to equity.53 
Even if we assume that the possibility of a public bailout becomes much more remote 
in view of these reforms, thereby eliminating moral hazard, market monitoring by 
means of shareholder and creditor monitoring would still be insufficient to prevent 
bank failures and safeguard systemic stability, for three reasons. As mentioned earlier, 
there is widespread evidence of systematic and often deliberate complexity in the 
financial sector.54 The financial network is so complex and opaque55 that it would be 
absurd to require shareholders to be able to possess the resources and skill to 
effectively monitor bank business and discipline boards.56 In today’s markets, there is 
certainly no private institution that potentially has the ability, resources and access to 
information to be able to conduct a risk analysis of all financial institutions, regulated 
and unregulated. 
Another reason relates to the nature of banking business. Due to banks’ 
susceptibility to runs, for business competition reasons, or because of relevant 
confidentiality agreements, certain crucial data on a bank’s business and the 
performance or profitability of certain business relationships will never be made 
public on a disaggregated basis. As a result, the effectiveness of monitoring of 
individual institutions by the market relying on publicly available data becomes less 
effective, and certainly less important than monitoring by regulators who have access 
to confidential data. 
Finally, there is the flawed concept of market (ir)rationality leading to 
equilibrium outcomes and systemic stability. First, the rational behaviour of one 
market actor may not be used as a reliable benchmark to predict the behaviour of all 
other market actors, and thus of the financial system. Moreover, there is the potential 
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54 Complexity theory is an interdisciplinary framework used to understand complex systems. It holds 
that while some systems are too complex to accurately predict their future, they do, nevertheless, 
exhibit identifiable underlying patterns that can help individuals cope with those systems’ complex 
workings. See, in general, H. A. Simon, ‘The Architecture of Complexity’ (1962) 106 Proceedings of 
the Am. Philosophical Society 467. 
55 S. L. Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’ (2009) 87 Washington University 
Law Rev. 211. 
56 M. F. Hellwig, ‘Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage 
Financial Crisis’, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2008/43 (November 
2008), at 59-60. 
! ∀∃!
for rational behaviour to lead to disequilibrium outcomes.57 Consider the case of a 
bank that suffers large losses on some of its loans. The prudent choice for this bank is 
to sell assets and also reduce its lending activities in line with its smaller capital base. 
If the bank in question is large, or the losses affect several banks at the same time, the 
individual bank’s attempt to rebuild its capital base will drain liquidity from the 
system and might even result panic sales of assets or discounts (fire-sales). In 
addition, less lending by some banks will translate into less funding to other banks 
which, if other sources of liquidity are not found, might be forced to cut lending 
levels. Credit restriction will, of course, have an impact on economic growth, 
lowering output and leading to further decreases in bank asset values, amplifying the 
deleveraging process.58    
 
3.  Shareholders as monitors in the banking Sector: Subjective Limitations 
(a) Board Myopia 
Shareholders’ agents in the corporation and supposed ‘implementers’ of their will are 
corporate boards, since shareholders have no direct directional power over key 
corporate executives. Yet the cognitive limitations of corporate boards, when 
measuring risk, especially in an industry as complex as banking, may not be 
underestimated.59 These range from bounded knowledge and understanding of their 
business to ‘groupthink’.60 It has been postulated that “the tendency of behavioral 
biases to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex organizations”, 
thus interfering with the acquisition, analysis, communication, and implementation of 
information within an organization and between an organization and external parties, 
constitutes intellectual hazard that ought to be seen as a systemic problem in financial 
markets.61  
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 Arguably, where a CEO does not recognize that, for instance, an asset bubble 
has formed, his/her compensation arrangements cannot possibly affect the assumption 
of risk taken by his bank. On the other hand, where a CEO does recognize that a 
bubble has formed in credit markets, professional and career concerns driven by 
pressure from (boundedly-rational) shareholders, and market short-termism, may 
cause him to remain in (or join) a particular market; to herd. This decision will be 
driven by two connected – and rational – factors: firstly, by the knowledge that if the 
CEO does not order his bank to enter an upwardly moving market, he might be 
replaced, as peers gain from the markets in question; and, secondly, by the concerted 
hope that his/her suspicions concerning the bubble in question were ill-founded. Thus, 
even where it can be shown that there is no overt assumption of risk linked to 
performance-based compensation awards, the net result will not differ. Naturally, this 
finding places a limitation to the power of Professor Bebchuk’s thesis on the central 
role of perverse compensation structures in bank failures.62 
 
(b) Shareholder Short-termism, myopia, and herding 
The monitoring problems posed by bounded rationality and cognitive limitations are 
compounded by the limited investment horizons of most institutional investors.63 
First, institutional investors have very few incentives to engineer takeover bids for 
firms or to remove poorly performing management. 64  This places an obvious 
limitation to the disciplining power of the much-vaunted market for corporate control. 
Investment funds are charged with procuring the maximum return on investment for 
their beneficiaries and will simply sell their shareholdings rather than engage directly 
with company management.65 Fund managers are, themselves, in competition with 
peer fund managers and the performance of their funds is normally benchmarked.66 
They will therefore have very few incentives to actively invoke their ability to 
discipline management or to launch takeover action and would rather exit a firm than 
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attempt to restructure its governance. In addition, in the UK and the US, large 
investors typically hold their shares for an average of just seven months, producing a 
relatively short effective time horizon for most institutional investors. This compares 
with an average holding period of four years 30 years ago, and eight years 70 years 
ago.67  
In fact, the assumption of greater short-term risks is a by-product of higher 
institutional investment: “compensation and risk-taking are not related to governance 
variables but co-vary with ownership by institutional investors who tend to have 
short-termist preferences and the power to influence firm management policies.”68 
Therefore, powerful shareholders will often desire managers who assume risk as 
opposed to more conservative executives: “[S]hareholders prefer excessive risk 
taking. So they may have an interest in pay arrangements that encourage risk-taking 
too much.”69 Many large shareholders will therefore encourage a focus on the short-
term and certainly cannot be expected to provide a source of extra discipline on 
management.70 Herding may be tacitly encouraged by investments which appear to 
provide commensurate risk-adjusted returns and regulation which requires banks to 
hold ‘safe’ capital.71   
Of course, shareholder short-termism in banks is tempered by the knowledge 
that any public rescue of their company will invariably mean a dilution of the value of 
their shares. However, competitive pressure amongst shareholders for returns and the 
availability of cheap debt, in an environment of low interest rates, which allows banks 
to maximize leverage-fuelled balance sheet returns, can easily convert shareholders 
from being risk-neutral to being risk-seekers. Shareholders have strong incentives for 
banks to operate with high leverage.72 The more a bank lends the more profit it 
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accrues. Thus, leverage-fuelled returns remove the possibility of a fruitful dialogue 
between principals and agents and might even crowd out investors who could make a 
long-term impact on executive behaviour. There is also substantial research to suggest 
that shareholders may be overconfident in their ability to ride asset bubbles, and ‘get 
out’ before a crash.73 This naturally places limits on the capacity of market discipline 
to reduce risk-taking. Accordingly, it is rather optimistic to expect institutional 
investors to act as true market monitors and rely on corporate governance 
mechanisms to restrain rent-seeking or to remedy the flawed uses of financial 
innovation.  
Moreover, even if institutional investors had either the incentives – or in an 
extreme scenario, the obligation – to monitor bank risk, they would still have failed in 
those duties. First, institutional investors are anything but immune to irrational 
exuberance and herding.74 As a result, as soon as good times return, all pretense of 
effective monitoring will be abandoned in favour of higher returns. Secondly, they are 
also constrained by aforesaid bounded rationality and lack of expertise. There is 
strong evidence that those within financial institutions, who understood the potential 
of financial revolution, pushed it to its limits in a rent-seeking exercise, inflating 
institutions’ profits and traders’ and managers’ salaries.75  Yet outsiders, mostly 
institutional investors, did not delve deeper to ascertain the source of financial 
institutions’ strong profitability that generated the hefty dividends and market price 
appreciation that boosted their returns from financial stocks. They also invariably 
approved in general meeting-after-general meeting executive compensations plans.  
 In fact, it appears that ‘owner-controlled’ banks had higher profits in the years 
before the 2008 crisis in comparison to ‘manager-controlled’ banks, but experienced 
larger losses and were more likely to require governmental assistance during the 
GFC. 76  One study after another has shown that firms with higher institutional 
ownership took “greater risk in their investment policies before the onset of the 
crisis.”77 Coffee rightly argues that:  
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Such evidence suggests that even if managers would prefer to avoid high risk and 
leverage, their preferences can be overridden by shareholders, and that institutional 
investors in particular can compel firms to accept greater risk and thus cause them to 
suffer worse losses in a crisis.
78
  
 
It is, therefore, worth exploring further the claim that shareholder greed was at least as 
culpable as executive greed for high levels of bank leverage and rapid asset expansion 
in the pre-GFC period, which led to a series of spectacular bank collapses.  
 
4. Corporate governance failures and risky bank behaviour 
(a) Is there a corporate governance fallacy? 
Studies prior to the GFC suggested that relative to manufacturing companies, banks 
had larger boards and the boards were objectively more independent (a greater 
number of independent directors). They further found that bank boards had more sub-
committees, which met fractionally more frequently, and that directors of bank boards 
earned considerably less than their counterparts at nonfinancial firms. 79  These 
findings would indicate, prima facie, stronger governance levels at banks relative to 
other companies, even before the GFC. 
Bank risk-taking is positively associated with comparative shareholder power, 
suggesting that in jurisdictions which prioritise shareholder supremacy, bank 
management are encouraged to take more risk.80 This finding tallies with research 
which demonstrates that owners with greater voting and cashflow powers have greater 
influence over managerial behaviour. 81  Further, it has been demonstrated from 
research into the performance of banks prior to – and during – the GFC, that banks 
with shareholder-friendly boards of directors suffered larger equity losses.82 This 
suggests that pro-shareholder governance (an indicator of ‘better governance’) might 
be inadequate in preventing managerial risk-taking in financial institutions.  
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Institutional ownership does not mitigate these effects. Research conducted 
into European commercial banks indicates that larger institutional investor ownership 
of banks correlates with a greater level of risk-taking by the banks concerned. 83 
During the GFC, firms with higher institutional ownership suffered greater losses84 as 
did US banks with relatively independent boards (indicated by the amount of money 
requested through the US Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)). These findings 
indicate that ensuring board independence is also possibly an ineffective check on 
bank risk-taking behaviour.85 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, bank shareholders 
have strong incentives to encourage banks to assume more debt to expand their 
balance sheet and thus increase leverage. The short-term investment horizons of most 
shareholders will, of course, be communicated to the board, and managers may be 
encouraged to pursue risk-laden strategies to boost short-term profits, regardless of 
the structure of their incentive contracts. It would appear, therefore, that the trust 
accorded to large shareholders to appoint boards, which will reduce risk-taking by 
executives, is misplaced. 
Moreover, there is a convincing line of research indicating that even properly-
designed compensation contracts, which seek to align principal-agent interests, may 
be unlikely to work as risk-reducing mechanisms, when it comes to very senior 
executives. Following the GFC, many commentators (most notably Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz86) contend that the incentive arrangements at large financial institutions were 
not responsible for bank failures or the creation of excess risk within the financial 
system. Senior management at financial institutions held significant equity positions 
and suffered substantial paper losses once stock prices began to fall sharply; indeed, 
banks with CEOs whose interest were most aligned with the interests of shareholders 
performed worst.87  
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The losses that CEOs suffered in these cases imply that the excessive risks 
present in the system were related, in addition to rent-seeking, to errors of judgment 
that could not remedied by a re-alignment of incentives. According to the 
aforementioned research, senior executives “managed their banks in a manner they 
authentically believed would benefit their shareholders.” 88 Senior bankers at 
institutions which failed did not willingly take massive risks, according to this view. 
For instance, most of the MBS products purchased by banks were low-yield, and 
perceived to be low-risk.89 In addition, it seems that CEOs of firms with relatively 
high equity stakes in their firms assumed the same level of risk as CEOs of firms with 
commensurately lower equity stakes.90 Finally, there were no significant reductions in 
equity positions amongst bank CEOS post-2006, which meant that they bore heavy 
losses in the market crash of 2008; in fact, CEO holdings of shares increased on net.91 
This suggests that even as the risk profile of bank investments appeared to change for 
the worse, bank CEOs did little to hedge their exposure to reduce any potential wealth 
losses92 although, admittedly, they cashed in a large number of stock options, which 
were made highly lucrative by leverage-fuelled bank profits.  
Arguably, two conclusions may be drawn from the foregone analysis. Firstly, 
there is convincing evidence that a number of senior managers were simply 
boundedly rational. They neither understood the risks that complex securities posed to 
their firms, nor the extent to which correlations in certain asset markets had been 
established across banking institutions.93 Secondly, CEOs complied with shareholder 
pressure to take risks across the board, irrespective of their individual equity wealth. 
Neither finding reveals that pay packages were not flawed, fostering excessive risk-
taking (Bebchuk’s thesis). Rather, they point to shareholders’ tacit approval for doing 
so. As Professor Coffee suggests: “shareholders, as principals, simply found ways to 
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contract with managers, as their agents, to accept greater risk through lucrative 
compensation formulas.”94 
But, again, this finding begs a further question: why were shareholders willing 
to do so? We argue that the main explanation for shareholder behaviour was the 
supra-competitive returns generated by debt-fuelled balance-sheet expansion, based 
on the willingness to exploit big banks’ cheap funding base.95 The same practice, of 
course, meant the assumption of catastrophically high levels of leverage and risk, as 
bank shareholders showed no inclination to lobby for a reinforcement of big banks’ 
slender equity bases.  
Another factor influencing shareholder attitudes must have been the relative 
safety provided to them by perceived notions of banks being ‘too-big-to-fail’, based 
on (a) bank size; and (b) bank centrality in the financial network.  
 
(b) Financial innovation, bank size and insider rent-seeking 
Prior to the GFC, market discipline was seen as the paramount tool to control 
excessive risk-taking by financial institutions, and regulators were anchored to the 
view that risk had been diversified and spread amongst the various units comprising 
the financial system. Yet it is now clear that homogenisation of trading behaviour and 
risk management techniques, interconnectedness spawned by financial innovation, 
and the speed of transmission of shocks from one area of the system to the next, 
created huge potential for contagion.96 
One of us has argued elsewhere97 that, without discarding the multitude of 
other causes, the best way to understand the GFC is to see it as predominantly the 
result of unco-ordinated risks which came together98 because of an economic and 
knowledge revolution that was badly mismanaged99 due to ignorance, complexity and 
opacity, excessive rent-seeking by insiders, and an inability to predict the risk 
correlations that new global trading channels, opened by the financial revolution, 
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would bring about under conditions of widespread panic. Arguably, certain aspects of 
financial innovation presented a serious breakthrough in knowledge, especially as 
regards the distribution/diversification of quantifiable credit and project (finance)100 
risk and the revolutionization of the channels available to access finance.  
In the past thirty years, financial innovation, technology breakthroughs and the 
nearly universal abdication of national capital restriction, led to the emergence of a 
new and poorly understood market landscape. In this landscape, capital flows across 
borders have been free and have taken place at extreme velocity. These flows have 
often supported transactions in very complex instruments. As a result, the disparate 
roots and branches of the global financial system became a tightly-knit and 
interdependent whole, rendering financial centres, national economies and individual 
institutions vulnerable to the volatile winds and moods of global markets. The new 
market landscape also provided very little room for the untangling of the purpose of 
individual transactions or for assertion of counterparties’ solvency. 
Moreover, the enormous insider rents to which information asymmetries 
generated by the complexity of innovative financial instruments and techniques give 
rise may only be curbed by controlling size and interconnectedness. Individuals 
within financial institutions have strong incentives to push the boundaries of 
complexity and obfuscation of product structure and returns.101 Reducing complexity 
will therefore lead naturally to superior corporate governance because shareholder 
and director interests would be become better-aligned. Corroborating evidence for this 
assertion is offered in the US Senate Report on the causes of the GFC, which 
demonstrates vividly how big US banks forced the boundaries of reckless lending in 
search of ever-higher returns through the use of complex securitization.102 Even in the 
absence of fraud, it is obvious that big banks were taking advantage of their higher 
sophistication and familiarity with the complex science of structured finance and were 
selling products to investors (including sophisticated investors) that were known to be 
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loss-making from the outset.  
 
IV. STRUCTURAL REFORM AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING BANK 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
This article argues that structural reform and other controls on bank size, complexity 
and interconnectedness to eliminate the public subsidy, 103  rather than stricter 
corporate governance framework and executive compensation controls, per se, are the 
keys to curbing insider rents. The great emphasis that contemporary resolution 
regimes place on shifting losses to shareholders from taxpayers strongly supports the 
point that proper regulation, rather than corporate governance reform, is crucial to a 
safer banking sector. By the same token, structural reform may lead to smaller and 
less interconnected banks and greater competition in the market, improving de facto 
corporate governance standards. 
The reform of the architecture of the banking sector has been widely discussed 
and, in some cases, acted upon by legislators both in the US and the UK.104 The 
various proposals and legislative initiatives differ sharply from each other. In addition, 
some scholars have suggested variations of the Glass-Steagall approach as a model of 
structural reform.105 Other commentators have proposed structural reform models that 
seek to re-conceptualize the business of banking.106 Disagreement on the exact scope 
of structural reform is important but it should not distract from its urgency and 
value.107 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 Coffee, op. cit. n. 94, at 1048. 
104 See, for example, the Volcker Rule in the US, which limits proprietary trading by commercial banks; 
and the Vickers Report in the UK, which has provided the basis for structural reform of the UK 
banking sector. 
105 The two most prominent academic models of narrow banking are by two well-known economists, 
Lawrence Kotlikoff and John Kay. See L. Kotlikoff, Jimmy Stewart Is Dead: Ending the World's 
Ongoing Financial Plague with Limited Purpose Banking (2010); J. Kay, ‘Narrow Banking: The 
Reform of Banking Regulation’ (CSFI Report, 2009), available at <http://www.johnkay.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/12/JK-Narrow-Banking.pdf>. 
106  E. Avgouleas, ‘The Reform of ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ Bank: A New Regulatory Model for the 
Institutional Separation of ‘Casino’ from ‘Utility’ Banking’, paper presented in the 7th Euroframe 
Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the EU, June 2010, available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1552970>.  
107 See A. G. Haldane and V. Madouros, ‘The Dog and the Frisbee’, speech delivered at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th economic policy symposium, “The Changing Policy Landscape”, 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 31 August 2012, available at 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2012/speech596.pdf>; L. G. 
Baxter, ‘Betting Big: Value, Caution, and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex 
Finance’ (2011-2012) 31 Rev. of Banking and Financial Law 765.  
! #∃!
Structural reform ought to be seen as an effective tool that could enhance 
corporate governance in the banking sector. Smaller and more focused banks would 
be more manageable, making the monitoring of outside ‘controllers’ such as 
shareholders and bondholders easier. A further benefit of structural reform, as 
opposed to solely improving corporate governance, would be a reduction in the 
widespread conflicts of interests that plague the financial services industry, and the 
nearly unlimited liability that big banks might incur due to those conflicts.108 Namely, 
as the boundaries of banks’ contractual relationships increase, for instance, by means 
of sponsoring high-risk securitization, or other shadow banking deals, attendant 
exposure may not only be hidden from the board and senior management but also 
become unlimited, destroying shareholder value. 109  Recommending ever-higher 
corporate governance and supervision standards in the circumstances may not only 
prove an exercise in futility, for the reasons explained in the sections above, but also 
shows an unpardonable unwillingness on the part of policy-makers to grasp the true 
causes of financial market complexity and the risks that this brings to bank 
shareholders. It follows that smaller and less interconnected banks would be both 
more visible in their exposures and also run a smaller risk of raking up unlimited 
liabilities. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It is plausibly argued that the grand scale rent-seeking by financial institutions and 
expert insiders, made possible by the financial revolution, was based on banks’ ability 
to free-ride on public subsidies and the public guarantee. It follows that limiting 
public subsidies to financial institutions, placing limits on their ability to leverage 
their balance sheet through the use of debt to fund their asset base, and remedying the 
‘too-big-to-fail’ problem are much better measures in preventing a new crisis than 
simply regulating bankers’ pay and re-aligning incentives within banks. Naturally, 
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108 A characteristic example of this was the huge losses incurred by one UK trader at JP Morgan, which 
were caused largely by senior management’s failure to understand the complexity and risks associated 
with the group’s portfolio. For a discussion, see J. Kregel, ‘More Swimming Lessons from the London 
Whale’, Levy Institute Public Policy Brief No. 129 (April 2013), available at 
<http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/?docid=1812>. 
109 See W. W. Bratton and A. J. Levitin, ‘A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken 
to Enron to Goldman Sachs’, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economics Research 
Paper No. 12-26 (August 2012). 
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banker compensation and corporate governance remain issues of public fascination 
and part of the quest for justice, given the devastation the GFC has wrought on 
national economies and peoples’ livelihoods. But they are not the only important 
issues. Thus, it is lamentable that they have stolen the limelight and taken so much of 
policy-makers’ time during that rare window of opportunity that existed between 
2008 and 2011 to redress the chronic defects in the regulation of the global financial 
services industry. 
 Accordingly, it is submitted that the EU should not have sought to reform 
banking sector corporate governance in isolation of the structural issues affecting 
governance incentives within large and complex banks. The most effective premise of 
good corporate governance in the financial sector is competition between smaller, 
less-complex and less-interconnected banks. Industry lobbying power aside, another 
possible explanation of this logical oversight is that age-old bias affecting policy-
makers (and, less often, academic commentators) when they need it least: groupthink! 
